美国发布07中国军力报告 忧解放军先制力增大 美国, 中国, 军力, 解放军

雄心不灭

中新网5月26日电 据美联社报道，美国国防部发布2007年中国军力报告，五角大楼将于于今天提交给国会。

美国国防部长盖茨将于数天后前往新加坡在一个国际会议上就亚洲安全议题发表讲演，中国预计将是国际会议上的一个主要议题。盖茨24日在向记者们介绍国防部有关中国军力报告时称，美国对中国的一些新实力感到关注，但是他没有提供细节。

此外，据国际先驱导报报道，5月21日，美国《防务新闻》周刊网站刊登了美国陆军军事学院战略问题研究所的一篇报告，该报告题为《中国核力量：作战、训练、思想、指挥、控制及战斗策划》，报告指出，中国武装部队军事实力的扩张，是正在改变中的东亚军事平衡一大元素；中国战略实力改进的程度，远超东亚地区所及的范围。又指解放军先发制人的能力越来越大，并以中国购买耐航的潜艇、无人驾驶战斗机及额外的精确导向地对空导弹为例作出说明。

忧中国核潜艇和洲际导弹

据海外传媒报道，美国国防部2007年中国军力报告特别提到中国发展094型弹道导弹核潜艇的速度相当惊人，这种核潜艇将搭载射程超过8000公里的核弹头。

美国政府还对中国准备部署新型陆基机动型DF-31A洲际弹道导弹的战略影响感到担心，这种导弹的射程可覆盖美国全境。


“中国正迅速成为一个军事竞争对手，”一位美国高级官员表示，“其速度令美国感到吃惊。”这位官员表示，报告将强调中国具备与美国军力抗衡的“最大潜力”。

该报告详细说明了“中国核武库对美国造成的潜在威胁”，并宣称“中国的核战略可能导致一场不必要的核冲突”。这篇耸人听闻的报告因其发表单位的权威性，已经引起亚洲战略分析家和西方防务界的注意。

中国政府曾强烈批评美国国防部以往发表的中国军力报告，认为报告将中国描绘成一个冷战风格的敌对国家。中国国防部昨日拒绝置评。

inamoto98

不算什么新闻啦 早就这么[赞]我们啦

红星银翼

谁有这个报告的 中文 人译版？

战斗精英

&*^#@%$^(*@$

bym101

先制力

DanTong

[转贴]

   美国于25日发布了中华人民共和国2007年度军事报告，29日清晨我拿到了详细的英文原版（公开版），昨晚通宵进行了翻译。因为本人英语水平有限，时间又紧迫，内容较多，文中的翻译会出现大量错误，请广大军迷谅解。
   
    《中华人民共和国2007年度军事报告》
   
    根据《2000财政年度国防授权法》向国会报告中华人民共和国的军事力量
   
    根据《2000财政年度国防授权法》第1202款关于“中华人民共和国年度军事力量报告”的规定,国防部长应每年提交一份报告“关于中国的当前及未来军事战略,报告中应针对目前和今后20年人民解放军的可能的军事技术的发展,中国的安全战略和军事战略,以及军事组织和作战观念.
    Section 1202, “Annual Report on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” of the　National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-65, provides that　the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “on the current and future military strategy　of the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future　course of military-technological development on the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets　and probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy,　and of the military organizations and operational concepts, through the next 20 years.”
   
    内容提要
   
    中国在区域性的政治和经济实力的迅速崛起,以成为全球当今战略环境的一个重要因素,对本地区和世界发挥着重要影响. 美国欢迎出现一个和平与繁荣的中国,鼓励中国作为一个负责任的国际利益,并对全球的健康与发展承担更大的责任. 然而, 中国还有许多不确定性的未来,包括中国扩充军力,权力如何使用.
   
    中国人民解放军,正在谋求全面转型,由在其领土的陆军大规模消耗战争，转变为能够打赢短期的, 高强度冲突，对付高技术对手--中国指为"局部战争条件下的信息化" 中国的军事实力目前仍然有限,但是, 正如在2006年的四年国防报告中所讲, 它"具有很大的潜力,在军事上与美国的竞争,在未来时间可能抵消美国传统的军事优势. "
   
    中国短期内的焦点是准备在台湾海峡的可能性军事行动,包括美国的干预, 看来是它现代化规划一个重要的驱动. 不过,分析中国的军事采购与战略思维,表明北京也可能因为资源冲突或领土争端，而在其它地区发生突发事件.
   
    中国的军事转型, 在发展速度和规模上,近年来一直在增长, 购买外国先进武器,刺激了本国国防和科学技术产业,而且对武装部队的改革影响深远.中国军队日益扩大的军事能力,是改变东亚的军事平衡的一个重要因素中国的战略能力的改善所产生的影响远远超出了亚太地区.
   
    中国战略力量的现代化,是提高其战略的打击能力,例如东风-31洲际弹道导弹, 2006年初取得了初步的威胁. 中国的太空计划的标志,是2007年1月成功试验一种能直接攻击卫星的武器, 反卫星武器对人类的航天飞行构成了危险,并危及到所有空间航天的国家的资产. 中国在继续追求传统的陆地,空中,海洋,以及空间和网络空间的现代战场.
   
    外部世界有限的了解中国的军事现代化的动机,决策与关键能力. 中国领导人尚未充分解释中国人民解放军扩充军力的目的或预期目的. 中国的行动,在某些方面似乎越来越不符合其申明的政策. 中国实际的国防支出仍远高于官方公布的数字. 这种缺乏透明度的中国军事事务自然会遭到国际社会的不理解和迅速的反应.
   
    China’s rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with global aspirations is an important element　of today’s strategic environment – one that has signifi cant implications for the region and the world. The　United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China, and it encourages China to participate as　a responsible international stakeholder by taking on a greater share of responsibility for the health and success　of the global system. However, much uncertainty surrounds the future course China’s leaders will set for their　country, including in the area of China’s expanding military power and how that power might be used.The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed　for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fi ghting and winning short-duration, highintensity　confl icts against high-tech adversaries – which China refers to as “local wars under conditions of　informatization.” China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance, at present, remains limited but, as　noted in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, it “has the greatest potential to compete militarily with　the United States and fi eld disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military　advantages.”China’s near-term focus on preparing for military contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, including the possibility　of U.S. intervention, appears to be an important driver of its modernization plans. However, analysis of　China’s military acquisitions and strategic thinking suggests Beijing is also generating capabilities for other　regional contingencies, such as confl ict over resources or territory.　The pace and scope of China’s military transformation has increased in recent years, fueled by continued high　rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, acquisition of advanced　foreign weapons, and far reaching reforms of the armed forces. The expanding military capabilities of China’s　armed forces are a major factor in changing East Asian military balances; improvements in China’s strategic　capabilities have ramifi cations far beyond the Asia Pacific region.China’s strategic forces modernization is enhancing strategic strike capabilities, as evidenced by the DF-31　intercontinental range ballistic missile, which achieved initial threat availability in 2006. China’s counterspace　program – punctuated by the January 2007 successful test of a direct-ascent, anti-satellite weapon – poses　dangers to human space fl ight and puts at risk the assets of all space faring nations. China’s continued pursuit　of area denial and anti-access strategies is expanding from the traditional land, air, and sea dimensions of the　modern battlefi eld to include space and cyber-space.　The outside world has limited knowledge of the motivations, decision-making, and key capabilities supporting　China’s military modernization. China’s leaders have yet to explain adequately the purposes or desired endstates　of the PLA’s expanding military capabilities. China’s actions in certain areas increasingly appear　inconsistent with its declaratory policies. Actual Chinese defense expenditures remain far above offi cially　disclosed fi gures. This lack of transparency in China’s military affairs will naturally and understandably　prompt international responses that hedge against the unknown.
    Table of Contents
   
    Chapter One: Key Developments 1
    Chapter Two: Understanding China’s Strategy 6
    Chapter Four: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 15
    Chapter Five: Resources for Force Modernization 25
    Chapter Six: Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait 30
    Appendix: China and Taiwan Forces Data 36

DanTong

第1章 关键发展
   
    中国的安全战略和军事战略
   
    Developments in China’s Grand Strategy,Security Strategy, and Military Strategy
   
    北京在2006年12月发布了中国国防白皮书,这是自1998年以来第五份中国国防白皮书, 描述了中国的安全观念和国防政策,以及实现其现代化的计划. 所宣传的政策,这份文件反映了中国轻微改善透明度,但这并不充分的阐述了中国军事力量的构成, 宗旨和军事发展的预期目的.
   
    Beijing released China’s National Defense　in 2006 in December, its fi fth Defense White　Paper since 1998, to describe China’s security　perceptions, national defense policies, and　the goals of its modernization programs. As　declaratory policy, the paper refl ects a modest　improvement in transparency, but it does not　adequately address the composition of China’s　military forces, or the purposes and desired endstates
    of China’s military development.
   
    北京在2006年10月发布了中国的航天活动,而前一版是于2000年出版. 本文回顾中国太空计划的历史,并提出了一个未来的规划图. 该文件还讨论了中国同各合作伙伴参与空间活动. 但它为能明确记载中国的航天计划和反空间活动,以及空间的军事应用.
   
    Beijing released China’s Space Activities in　2006 in October – the previous edition was　published in 2000. The paper reviews the　history of China’s space program and presents a　roadmap for the future. The paper also discusses　China’s cooperation with various partners in　space activities. It remains silent on the military　applications of China’s space programs and　counterspace activities.
   
    2007年1月,中国向本国的一颗气象卫星成功地试射了一枚反卫星导弹, 展示了中国有能力攻击在低地球轨道上运行的卫星. 测试所产生的前所未有的碎片对所有的有空间航行器的国家构成了危害.
   
    In January 2007, China successfully tested　a direct-ascent, anti-satellite (ASAT) missile　against a Chinese weather satellite, demonstrating　China’s ability to attack satellites operating in　low-Earth orbit. The test put at risk the assets　of all space faring nations and posed dangers　to human space fl ight due to the creation of an
    unprecedented amount of debris.
   
    证据表明在2006年,中国修改了1993年新的历史时期的军事战略方针, 人民解放军指导文件的军事战略与军事力量的发展. 具体指引的内容尚不得而知.
   
    Evidence in 2006 suggests that China revised the　1993 Military Strategic Guidelines for the New　Period, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)　guidance documents for military strategy and　forces development. The specifi c contents of the　guidelines are not known.
   
    中华人民共和国主席胡锦涛和俄罗斯总统普京宣布2006年为"俄罗斯年",并在北京期间举行了3次会议,这是在不到12个月的时间内,两国领导人之间的第五次会议. 两国于2005年建立它们的联合军事演习, 2007年两位领导人同意加强军事交流,并举办八次军事合作活动.
   
    PRC President Hu Jintao and Russian President　Vladimir Putin proclaimed 2006 as “The Year of　Russia” during their March meeting in Beijing,　the leaders’ fi fth meeting in less than twelve　months. Building on their joint exercise in　2005, the two leaders agreed to increase military　exchanges and hold eight cooperative military　activities in 2007.
    在2006年最大的年度新能源所签订的合约中,反映了日益关注的能源和资源的需求,包括同沙特阿拉伯和几个非洲国家的新的协定. 中国努力使得中国与非洲国家在2006年的合作达到高潮, 11月的首脑会议在北京由非洲53个国家中的40个国家的元首以及8个国家的代表出席.
   
    Refl ecting increasing concerns over energy and　resource needs, 2006 saw the largest annual　increase in new energy contracts signed by China,　including new agreements with Saudi Arabia　and several African countries. China’s effort to　court African nations in 2006 culminated with　a November summit in Beijing attended by 40　heads of state and delegates from 48 of the 53　African nations.
   
    2006年3月,中国正式开展的第11个五年计划( 2006-2010年),其中包括雄心勃勃的计划20 %降低能耗,每单位国内生产总值(国内生产总值) 2010年增加了一倍,中国国内生产总值到2010年比2000年番一番,整体国内生产总值4万亿美元,到2020年. 该计划强调和谐发展,加强在农村的投入,解决收入差距和社会动荡.
   
    In March 2006, China formally launched its 11th　Five Year Plan (2006-2010), which includes　ambitious calls for a 20 percent reduction in　energy consumption per unit of Gross Domestic　Product (GDP) by 2010, a doubling of China’s　2000 GDP by 2010, and an overall GDP of $4　trillion by 2020. The plan stresses coordinated　development, and greater investment and　urbanization in the rural interior, to address　income disparities and social unrest.
   
    官方的报告称, 在2006年完成"群众性事件"下降22 % . 不过,在这些事件中,主要是针对地方政策以及官员, 持续反映了民众对财产权利和强迫迁移,劳动权益,养老金腐败和警察的暴行的不满.
   
    Offi cial reports claim the number of “mass　incidents” declined 22 percent in 2006.　Nevertheless, these incidents, directed mainly　at local policies and offi cials, refl ect continued　popular dissatisfaction with offi cial behavior　related to property rights and forced relocations,　labor rights, pensions, pollution, corruption, and　police brutality.
   
    中国的区域发展与战略
   
    Developments Related to China’s Regional　Strategy
   
    中国对于朝鲜在7月日本海上空发射的弹道导弹,和10月的核试验,投票支持联合国安理会1695号和1718号的决议,继续努力使用外交手段, 具体来说,六方会谈是中国的解决朝鲜的核问题的计划. 会谈中,包括美国,日本,韩国,俄罗斯和朝鲜,以及中国等签署协议, 2007年2月初步执行2005年9月的联合声明,即朝鲜半岛无核化.
   
    China responded to North Korea’s ballistic missile launches over the Sea of Japan in July and nuclear test in October by voting in favor of UN Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718 and by continuing efforts to use diplomatic means, specifi cally the Six Party Talks, which China hosts, to address North Korea’s nuclear programs. The Talks, which involve the United States, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and North Korea, as well as China, produced agreement in February 2007 on initial steps to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.
   
    日本新首相安倍晋三在11月的访问中国之行,有助于缓解东京与北京之间的紧张关系.然而,诸如在东海的领土纠纷,对尖阁/钓鱼台群岛的归属问题,中国努力阻止日本争夺一个联合国安理会常任理事国席位,是导致双方的摩擦根源.
   
    The visit of new Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to China in November helped to ease somewhat tensions between Tokyo and Beijing. However, issues such as territorial disputes in the East China Sea, over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, and China’s efforts to block Japan’s quest for a seat on the UN Security Council remain sources of friction.
    2006年10月,中国人民解放军海军的宋级柴油电力潜艇,在日本近海的小鹰号航母附近露出水面在. 这一事件表明,必须长期努力,提高美国和中国的军用飞机和海军在彼此靠得很近时的安全性. 2006年 这些努力产生了两个分期双边搜索及拯救演习 (一期在美国海岸,二期在中国沿海) .
   
    In October 2006, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy SONG-class diesel-electric submarine broached the surface in close proximity to the USS KITTY HAWK aircraft carrier in waters near Japan. This incident demonstrated the importance of long-standing U.S. efforts to improve the safety of U.S. and Chinese military air and maritime assets operating near each other. In 2006, these efforts produced a two phased bilateral search and rescue exercise with the PLA Navy (one phase off the U.S. coast, the second off the PRC coast).
   
    2006年,中国先后与上海合作组织( SCO )的成员国进行了两次反恐怖演习, 上海合作组织第五届周年纪念日将于六月在上海召开.
   
    In 2006, China conducted two counterterrorism exercises with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) partners, and hosted the fi fth anniversary of the founding of the SCO in Shanghai in June.
   
    中国正在增加其在亚太经济合作组织( APEC ),东南亚国家联盟(东盟) 与东盟区域论坛( ARF )的作用 . 美国鼓励这种参与率的提高,并与中方共同主持了东盟关于防扩散问题. 在2006年10月东盟首脑会议上,中国总理温家宝建议扩大中国与东盟在安全和防务领域的合作.
   
    China is increasing its role in the Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The United States has encouraged this increased participation, and cooperated with China to co-chair an ARF seminar on nonproliferation. During the October 2006 ASEAN Summit, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao proposed expanded security and defense cooperation between China and ASEAN.
   
    2006年11月,中华人民共和国主席胡锦涛首先对印度进行访问,这是10年来中国国家元首对印度的首次访问, 充分表明了中国政府在保持与巴基斯坦的战略同时,改善与印度的关系.
   
    In November 2006, PRC President Hu Jintao made the fi rst visit to India by a PRC head of state in ten years, demonstrating the importance China places on improving ties with India while preserving its strategic relationship with Pakistan.
   
    中国的军事力量发展
   
    Developments in China’s Military Forces
   
    中国奉行的长期的,全面的改造它的军事力量,以提高其军事能力.符合台海有事时,短期集中精力攻取台湾, 中国在各军区部署的其最先进的系统,直接面对着台湾.
   
    China is pursuing long-term, comprehensive transformation of its military forces to improve its capabilities for power projection, anti-access, and area denial. Consistent with a near-term focus on preparing for offensive Taiwan Strait contingencies, China deploys its most advanced systems to the military regions directly opposite Taiwan.
   
    弹道和巡航导弹Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
   
    中国正在发展和试验进攻性导弹,形成额外的导弹部队,提升了某些导弹系统和开发方法的质量,以对付美国弹道导弹防御系统.
   
    到2006年10月,中国已台湾对面部署了大约900移动CSS-6和CSS-7短程弹道导弹, 并且以大约每年100枚的速度增加. 而且新型号的射程和精度都有提高.
   
    中国的现代化远程弹道导弹武力,加入了更多的本国系统. 采用固体燃料的陆基机动的东风-31型洲际远程弹道导弹在 2006年初步形成威慑能力, 并且可能或者已经具备实战能力. 射程更远的东风-31A ,预计在2007年达到初始作战能力. 中国正在制订一项新的潜射弹道导弹, 巨浪-2，预计于2007到2010间获得初始战斗能力. 这种导弹将会配备于同样也处于发展中的094型晋级战略导弹核潜艇上.
    中国正在探索使用弹道导弹和巡航导弹执行反介入任务，这其中包括反航母和战术攻击，而且中国一直在致力于侦察和通信系统的研制以获得更好的指挥、控制和瞄准能力。
   
    China is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, upgrading qualitatively certain missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.
   
    By October 2006, China had deployed roughly 900 mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range ballistic missiles to garrisons opposite Taiwan, expanding at a rate of more than 100 missiles per year. Newer versions of these missiles have improved range and accuracy.
   
    China is modernizing its longer-range ballistic missile force by adding more survivable systems. The road-mobile, solid-propellant DF-31 intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) achieved initial threat availability in 2006 and will likely achieve operational status in the near future, if it has not already done so. A longer range variant, the DF-31A, is expected to reach initial operational capability (IOC) in 2007. China is also working on a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-2 (IOC 2007-2010), for deployment on a new JIN-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, also in development.
   
    China continues to explore the use of ballistic and cruise missiles for anti-access missions, including counter-carrier and land attack, and is working on reconnaissance and communication systems to improve command, control, and targeting.
   
    海军实力Naval Power.
   
    中国海军包括72艘主要军舰,大约58艘攻击潜艇,以及约50艘中型和重型两栖舰艇,大约41艘沿海导弹巡逻艇.
   
    中国在2006年年底获得了第二批两艘现代级2型导弹驱逐舰. 这些驱逐舰配备反舰巡航导弹(ASCMS),也使防空系统有了改善.现代级驱逐舰是早些时候中国从俄罗斯购进的.
   
    中国正在建设和试验的第二代核潜艇, 包括晋级(094型)核动力导弹潜艇以及商级 (093型)核动力攻击潜艇，其中后者于2005年开始试航.
   
    中国已接收两艘基洛级潜艇, 至此2002年中俄约定的关于8艘潜艇的交易已经全部完成. 中国拥有12艘基洛级潜艇, 它们当中最新的一些装备有超音速SS-N-27B 反舰导弹,以及线导和尾流自导鱼雷.
   
    解放军海军最新军舰, 是旅洲级(051C型)防空驱逐舰. 它配备为俄罗斯SA-N-20 SAM系统控制的TOMBSTONE相控阵雷达. SA-N-20能够使解放军海军防空体系得到显着的改善, 提高中国的舰载防空能力.
   
    旅洲级驱逐舰能够补充正在发展的旅洋级( 052B型)和旅洋2( 052c型)驱逐舰 . 旅洲级驱逐舰配备有俄罗斯SA-N-7B GRIZZLY SAM和YJ-83 ASCM. 旅洋2驱逐舰则在同一防空系统的基础上,配备国产的HHQ-9 SAM.
   
    2006年,中国开始下水第一艘导弹护卫舰(FFG),江凯2( 054A型) . 江凯2将装有正在发展的HHQ-16中程垂直发射防空导弹.
   
    在2006年珠海航展上,中国军方和文职官员宣称中国有兴趣兴建一艘航空母舰.
   
    China’s naval forces include 72 principal combatants, some 58 attack submarines, about 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift vessels, and approximately 41 coastal missile patrol craft.
   
    China received the second of two Russianmade SOVREMENNYY II guided missile destroyers (DDG) in late 2006. These DDGs are fi tted with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and wide-area air defense systems that feature qualitative improvements over the earlier SOVREMENNYY-class DDGs China purchased from Russia.
    China is building and testing second-generation nuclear submarines with the JIN-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and the SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclear-powered attack submarine, which began sea trials in 2005.
   
    China took delivery of two KILO-class submarines from Russia, completing a contract for eight signed in 2002. China operates twelve KILOs, the newest of which are equipped with the supersonic SS-N-27B ASCM, and wireguided and wake-homing torpedoes.
   
   
    The PLA Navy’s newest ship, the LUZHOUclass (Type 051C) DDG is designed for anti-air warfare. It will be equipped with the Russian SA-N-20 SAM system controlled by the TOMBSTONE phased-array radar. The SA-N- 20 more than doubles the range of current PLA Navy air defense systems marking a signifi cant improvement in China’s ship-borne air defense capability.
   
    The LUZHOU-class DDG complements ongoing developments of the LUYANG I (Type 052B) and LUYANG II (Type 052C) DDGs. The LUYANG I is fi tted with the Russian SA-N-7B GRIZZLY SAM and the YJ-83 ASCM. The LUYANG II is fi tted with an air defense system based on the indigenous HHQ-9 SAM.
   
    In 2006, China began producing its fi rst guidedmissile frigate (FFG), the JIANGKAI II (Type 054A). The JIANGKAI II will be fi tted with the medium range HHQ-16, a vertically launched naval surface-to-air missile currently in development.
   
    At the 2006 Zhuhai Air Show, PRC military and civilian offi cials asserted China’s interest in building an aircraft carrier.
   
    空中力量Air Power
   
    中国目前已有超过700多架战斗机能够正常飞行,台湾及其机场的容量将远远扩大这一数字. 解放军正在升级许多旧型号的飞机(例如,升级B-6轰炸机的引擎,以提高作战范围) ; 然而,新的飞机构成了越来越大的百分比清单.
   
    中国人民解放军空军正在部署歼10多用途战斗机. 歼10是中国的第四代战斗机,将是中国在未来的数十年内的第一战斗机.
   
    中国目前正在俄罗斯的合作生产协议下,生产苏27SMK/FLANKER(F-11A)多用途战斗机. 中国正在生产越来越多的Su-30MKK/FLANKER多用途战斗机及其变种的海军苏-30MK2.
   
    中国的战斗机正装备有一批日益精密的空对空和空对地武器,卫星和激光制导的精确弹药和巡航导弹.
   
    我国第一部自行研制的攻击直升机,直- 10正在试飞. 直- 10将配备红箭8E反坦克导弹,其作战能力相当于欧洲的虎式,但在美国的AH-64阿帕奇直升机之下.
   
    改善FB-7战斗机的计划将使这型旧飞机能够执行夜间海上攻击行动,并使用改良武器,例如Kh-31P(AS-17)反辐射导弹和KAB-500激光制导导弹.
   
    China has more than 700 combat aircraft based within an un-refueled operational range of Taiwan and the airfi eld capacity to expand that number signifi cantly. Many aircraft in the PLA force structure are upgrades of older models (e.g., re-engined B-6 bombers for extended ranges); however, newer aircraft make up a growing percentage of the inventory.
   
    The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is deploying the F-10 multi-role fi ghter to operational units. The F-10, a fourth generation aircraft, will be China’s premier fi ghter in the coming decades.
   
    China is now producing the multi-role Su- 27SMK/FLANKER (F-11A) fi ghter under a licensed co-production agreement with Russia following an initial production run of Su-27SKs (F-11). China is employing increasing numbers of the multi-role Su-30MKK/FLANKER fi ghterbomber and its naval variant, the Su-30MK2.
    Chinese aircraft are armed with an increasingly sophisticated array of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons, satellite and laser-guided precision munitions, and cruise missiles.
   
    China’s fi rst indigenously produced attack helicopter, the Z-10, is undergoing fl ight testing. The Z-10 will fi re the Red Arrow 8E anti-tank guided missile, offering combat performance equal to the Eurocopter Tiger, but below that of the AH-64 Apache.
   
    Improvements to the FB-7 fi ghter program will enable this older aircraft to perform nighttime maritime strike operations and use improved weapons such as the Kh-31P (AS-17) antiradiation missile and KAB-500 laser-guided munitions.
   
    防空Air Defense.
   
    在未来几年,中国将接收其俄制S- 300PMU-2型防空导弹系统. 有效射程达200公里, S- 300PMU-2提供了增加杀伤力的反战术弹道导弹及更有效的电子对抗. 中国也正在发展国产HQ-9防空导弹系统,以相控阵雷达为基础,射程为150公里. 如上所述, 海军HHQ-9将部署于旅洋2型驱逐舰,垂直发射的SAM (HHQ-16)将部署于江凯2型护卫舰 .
   
    In the next few years, China will receive its fi rst battalion of Russian-made S- 300PMU-2 surface-to-air missile systems. With an advertised intercept range of 200 km, the S- 300PMU-2 provides increased lethality against tactical ballistic missiles and more effective electronic countermeasures. China also is developing the indigenous HQ-9 air defense missile system, a phased array radar-based SAM with a 150 km range. As noted above, a naval variant (HHQ-9) will deploy on the LUYANG II DDG and a vertical launch naval SAM (HHQ-16) will deploy on the JIANGKAI II FFG.
   
    地面部队Ground Forces
   
    中国有大约140万人的陆军部队,其中约有40万人部署在台湾对面的三个军区. 中国一直在升级这些部队的坦克,装甲运兵车,以及更多的火炮. 2006年4月,中国第一次装备了新的第三代主战坦克, ZTZ-99,将装备在北京军区和沈阳军区.
   
    China has about 1.4 million ground forces personnel with approximately 400,000 deployed to the three military regions opposite Taiwan. China has been upgrading these units with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and additional artillery pieces. In April 2006, China made its fi rst delivery of the new third generation main battle tank, the ZTZ-99, to units in the Beijing and Shenyang military regions.
   
    两栖力量Amphibious Forces
   
    解放军装备了新的两栖攻击车(AAV) ,并将升级现有的车辆,包括两栖坦克和突击车辆. 其新型水陆两栖车有更稳定的性能. 同时增加两栖训练,包括一年中的多种演习训练,这是一支正在建设中的两栖力量.
   
    The PLA has deployed a new amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) and developed a range of modifi cations for existing vehicles including fl otation tanks and mounted outboard engines. Its newer amphibious vehicles have greater stability and performance in open water. Increased amphibious training, including multiple training evolutions in a single year, is building profi ciency among China’s amphibious forces.
   
    中国军事学说的发展
   
    Developments in Chinese Military Doctrine
   
    中国将继续把重点放在"信息化"的条件,提高综合性的联合行动, 联勤和远程机动能力.
   
    2006年6月 解放军推出了新的指导,在演习中使用模拟器和假想敌,以提高实战训练能力.
   
    2006年12月,中国人民解放军第二炮兵,海军,空军和陆军的军事学院的领导,签订了合作办学协议,为联合专业军事教育铺平了道路.
    2006年12月,中国国防动员委员会发出"国防教育活动"的纲要 ,规范国防教育,包括"唤起爱国主义...和提高公民的环保意识,自己的国防职责. "
   
    China continues to focus on capabilities to operate under “informatized” conditions with an emphasis on integrated joint operations, joint logistics, and long-range mobility.
   
    In June 2006, the PLA released new guidance to increase realism in training and to expand the use of simulators and opposing forces in training evolutions.
   
    In December 2006, the leaders of the command colleges for the PLA Second Artillery Corps, the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and PLA ground forces signed a cooperative education agreement paving the way for joint professional military education.
   
    In December 2006, the National Defense Mobilization Committee issued the “Outline of National Defense Education for all Citizens,” to standardize defense education across China. The goals of such education include “arousing patriotism … and raising the citizens’ awareness of their national defense duty.”
   
    评估对台湾的威慑
   
    Assessment of Challenges to Taiwan’s　Deterrent Forces
   
    台湾海峡附近,在2006年无武装事件,整个经济形势继续保持稳定. 北京对台湾总统陈水扁,在2006年初暂停国统会和国统纲领的决定做出了反应. 但是,中国的军事现代化和部署先进能力对台湾局势没有缓解, 随着力量的平衡不断变化,大陆的偏袒,可能造成在2008年3月的台湾下届总统大选计划的紧张.
   
    台湾的国防支出是扭转下降趋势. 2005年,台湾的领导人宣布计划在2008年增加国防开支占国内生产总值的3 % . 2006年,这个数字约为2.4 %的比重. 2007年国防预算要求的资金在一个水平,国内生产总值的2.8% , 与2007年计划的补充要求将提高为2.85 % .
   
    台湾放弃的策略是运用特别预算,在2001年采购美国的主要防御系统.但是台湾立法院尚未通过这些拨款法案.
   
    根据台湾关系法 ,美国将继续提供防御物品,服务培训和协助,让台湾维持足够的自卫能力. 2006年9月,台湾接受交付了的最后两艘基德级导弹驱逐舰.
   
    There were no armed incidents in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait in 2006 and the overall situation remained stable, as it was for most of 2005. Beijing reacted responsibly to Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s decision to suspend the National Unifi cation Council and National Unifi cation Guidelines in early 2006. However, China’s military modernization and the deployment of advanced capabilities opposite the island have not eased, with the balance of forces continuing to shift in the mainland’s favor. Tension could also increase as Taiwan prepares for its next presidential election planned for March 2008.
   
    Taiwan appears to be reversing the trend of declining defense expenditures. In 2005, Taiwan leaders announced plans to increase defense spending to three percent of GDP by 2008. In 2006, this fi gure was approximately 2.4 percent of GDP. The 2007 defense budget requests funds at a level of 2.8 percent of GDP, with a planned 2007 supplemental request expected to raise this fi gure to 2.85 percent.
   
    Taiwan abandoned the strategy of using a Special Budget to procure major defense systems approved for sale by the United States in 2001. It will attempt instead to fund the programs in the regular defense budget and budget supplementals. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan has yet to pass these funding bills, however.
   
    Consistent with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8 (1979), the United States continues to make available defense articles, services, and training assistance to enable Taiwan to maintain a suffi cient selfdefense capability. In September 2006, Taiwan accepted delivery of the last two of four KIDDclass DDGs.

DanTong

第2章 了解中国的战略
   
    概况
   
    中国的领导人并不明确地提供一个包罗万象的"大战略" ,概述了战略目标和实现这些目标的手段. 这种模糊性可能反映了刻意隐瞒的战略规划,中国领导人自己也对他们自己的长远目标和战略的不确定性. 但这仍然是有可能作出一些基于战略传统历史格局,声明,正式文件,某些军事能力,以及近期的外交努力的中国"大战略".
   
    China’s leaders do not explicitly provide an overarching “grand strategy” that outlines strategic goals and the means to achieve them. Such vagueness may refl ect a deliberate effort to conceal strategic planning, as well as uncertainties, disagreements, and debates that China’s leaders themselves have about their own long-term goals and strategies. Still, it is possible to make some generalizations about Chinese “grand strategy” based on strategic tradition, historical patterns, statements and offi cial papers, an emphasis on certain military capabilities, and recent diplomatic efforts.
   
    战略与中国特色
   
    Strategy with Chinese Characteristics
   
    中国的总体战略,在于希望保持中国共产党为核心的连续统治. 一个根深蒂固的害怕失去政权的领导阶层的战略观,驱使他们很多的选择. 作为替代失败的共产主义意识形态,中共已根据其合法性的两大支柱的经济表现和民族主义. 作为一种后果, 国内的经济和社会困难,可能导致中国试图加强支持激发民族主义情绪,可能导致比我们本来期望的外交及安全事务更具侵略性的行为.
   
    中国领导人和战略家们很少使用西方国家的方法手段建构商讨策略. 相反,他们讨论战略的两个核心理念: “综合国力”( CNP )和“战略的配置权力”.这些观念形成怎样的中国战略规划,评估安全环境,了解中国的相对位置,在世界上作出调整,流行的地缘政治趋势.
   
    CNP.中国战略规划者使用CNP分数评价中国相对于其他国家的地位. 这些成绩是基于定性与定量措施内,天然资源,经济繁荣,我们的外交影响,国际声望, 国内凝聚力,提高战斗力,和文化的影响力. 中国领导的文职和军事智库申请有不同的标准CNP.2006年中国社会科学院的一份报告,在经济,军事, 外交上,中国排名第六,在世界强国之林.
   
    自八十年代初以来,中国领导人曾形容自己的国家发展战略,以谋求提高中国CNP. 他们强调经济增长和科技创新为中心,加强CNP. 一个关键的假设,这一战略,是经济繁荣和稳定将给予中国更大的国际影响力和外交杠杆以及强大的现代化军事力量.
   
    2006年4月官方的解放军日报的评论CNP之间的关系, 军队现代化建设,中国的国际地位: "随着中国综合国力的逐步展开,它的地位不断上升,在国际事务中, 这是一件重大的事情,要努力建设一支军事力量,是同中国的国际地位,胜任这项工作的利益出发来维护中国的发展,以巩固我国的国际地位. "
   
    "战略格局的力量" ,大概理解为"联盟的力量",尽管并无直接相当于西方的名词. 中国战略规划者不断为了潜在威胁评估"战略格局的力量" (例如,台湾的潜在的冲突)以及机会(例如, 在苏联崩溃)可能迅速调整国家战略.
   
    中国领导人形容21世纪最初的几十年中,是一个"20年机遇期" ,也就是区域和国际形势总体是和平和有利于经济,外交和军事发展的,从而使中国崛起成为一个大国. 与此密切相关的概念是"和平发展"运动,以平息外国对中国的军事现代化及其全球化的评议,宣告中国的崛起将是和平的.
   
    At the core of China’s overall strategy rests the desire to maintain the continuous rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). A deep-rooted fear of losing political power shapes the leadership’s strategic outlook and drives many of its choices. As a substitute for the failure of communist ideology, the CCP has based its legitimacy on the twin pillars of economic performance and nationalism. As a consequence, domestic economic and social diffi culties may lead China to attempt to bolster support by stimulating nationalist sentiment which could result in more aggressive behavior in foreign and security affairs than we might otherwise expect.
    Chinese leaders and strategists rarely use a Western “ends-ways-means” construct to discuss strategy. Rather, they discuss strategy in terms of two central concepts: “comprehensive national power” (CNP) and the “strategic confi guration of power.” These concepts shape how Chinese strategic planners assess the security environment, gauge China’s relative position in the world, and make adjustments to account for prevailing geopolitical trends.
   
    CNP. China’s strategic planners use CNP scores to evaluate China’s standing in relation to other nations. These scores are based on qualitative and quantitative measures of territory, natural resources, economic prosperity, diplomatic infl uence, international prestige, domestic cohesiveness, military capability, and cultural infl uence. China’s leading civilian and military think tanks apply slightly different criteria for CNP. A 2006 report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, for example, used economic, military, and diplomatic metrics to rank China sixth among the world powers.
   
    Since the early 1980s, China’s leaders have described their national development strategy as a quest to increase China’s CNP. They stress economic growth and innovation in science and technology as central to strengthening CNP. A key assumption of this strategy is that economic prosperity and stability will afford China greater international infl uence and diplomatic leverage as well as a robust, modern military
   
    A commentary in the offi cial Liberation Army Daily in April 2006 shed some light on the relationship between CNP, military modernization, and China’s international status: “As China’s comprehensive strength is incrementally mounting and her status keeps on going up in international affairs, it is a matter of great importance to strive to construct a military force that is commensurate with China’s status and up to the job of defending the interests of China’s development, so as to entrench China’s international status.”
   
    “Strategic Confi guration of Power.” The “strategic confi guration of power,” or “shi,” is roughly understood as an “alignment of forces,” although there is no direct Western equivalent to the term. Chinese strategic planners continuously assess the “strategic confi guration of power” for potential threats (e.g., potential confl ict over Taiwan that involves the United States) as well as opportunities (e.g., the collapse of the Soviet Union) that might prompt an adjustment in national strategy.
   
    China’s leaders describe the initial decades of the 21st Century as a “20-year period of opportunity,” meaning that regional and international conditions will generally be peaceful and conducive to economic, diplomatic, and military development and thus to China’s rise as a great power. Closely linked to this concept is the “peaceful development” campaign to assuage foreign concerns over China’s military modernization and its global agenda by proclaiming that China’s rise will be peaceful and that confl ict is not a necessary corollary to the emergence of a new power.
   
    安定,国家的主权和策略
   
    Stability, Sovereignty, and Strategy
   
    北京对中国国内的政治局势和国际环境的看法认为应延续共产党的统治.政权的生存形状同样取决于党的领导人如何看待中国周边国家的不稳定.例如,朝鲜,中亚可能升级或波及中国. 关注合法性也影响了北京对待中国的陆地和海上的领土地位要求, 因为任何挑战中国主权,可能会削弱力量和党的权威.
   
    中国同许多邻国近年来解决了领土争端问题. 然而,与日本在东海的纠纷,与印度在其共同边界, 与东南亚国家在南中国海,争端仍然存在. 虽然中国已经在试图阻止这些纠纷破坏区域关系, 偶尔发言的中共官员强调,中国有能力在这些领域解决争端. 举例来说,胡锦涛历史性的2006年10月对印度的访问, 中共大使孙玉玺告诉印度新闻界 "我们的立场是阿鲁纳查尔邦是中国领土的一部分"
    The perpetuation of CCP rule shapes Beijing’s perceptions of China’s domestic political situation and the international environment. Regime survival likewise shapes how Party leaders view instability along China’s periphery – e.g., North Korea, Central Asia – which could escalate or spill over into China. Concern over maintaining legitimacy also infl uences how Beijing treats the status of China’s land and maritime territorial claims, since any challenge to Chinese sovereignty could undermine the strength and authority of the Party.
   
    China has settled territorial disputes with many of its neighbors in recent years. However, disputes with Japan in the East China Sea, with India along their shared border, and with Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea remain. Although China has attempted to prevent these disputes from disrupting regional relations, occasional statements by PRC offi cials underscore China’s resolve in these areas. For example, on the eve of President Hu’s historic October 2006 visit to India, PRC Ambassador Sun Yuxi told Indian press, “the whole of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory . . . we are claiming all of that – that’s our position.”
   
    平衡,地位和战略
   
    Balance, Position, and Strategy
   
    中国在维持边界的稳定,维护领土的完整,一直在保持努力,北京旨在推进其战略利益纳入"大周边"包括中亚和中东. 安全目标,这背后的重点包括维护获得资源和市场, 并与其他的权力,包括美国,日本, 与印度建立一个区域的存在和影响力的平衡.
   
    同样,中国的战略,对发展中世界的目的是为了取得对资源和市场, 建立影响多边机构,如联合国,并限制台湾的外交空间. 建立这些关系, 中国强调它自己宣传的地位, 在发展中国家作为该领导者,是一个能够调和全球化影响的看法和观念上引起的局部地区矛盾,缩小"南北"差距.
   
    Beyond China’s efforts to maintain stability on its borders and assert its territorial claims, Beijing seeks to advance its strategic interests into the “greater periphery” encompassing Central Asia and the Middle East. The security goals behind this emphasis include maintaining access to resources and markets, and establishing a regional presence and infl uence to balance and compete with other powers, including the United States, Japan, and India in areas distant from China’s borders.
   
    Similarly, China’s strategy for the developing world seeks to secure access to resources and markets, build infl uence in multilateral bodies such as the United Nations, and restrict Taiwan’s diplomatic space. To build these relationships, China emphasizes its self-proclaimed status as the leader of the developing world and one that can sympathize with local dissatisfaction over the effects of globalization and perceptions of a widening “north-south” gap.
   
    资源需求趋势与策略
   
    Resource Demands and Strategy
   
    随着中国经济的发展,依赖于可靠的市场准入和自然资源,特别是金属和矿物燃料，正成为一个更加迫切地影响中国的战略行为. 目前,中国不能保护其国外能源供应的路线,其中包括穿过马六甲海峡的约80 %的中进口石油。胡主席称之为"马六甲难题"
   
    中国的能源约三分之二是依靠煤,但其对石油和天然气需求正在增加. 2003年,中国成为世界第二大消费国和第三大石油进口国. 目前中国进口超过40 %的石油(约250万桶, 2005年) . 到2025年,这一数字将上升到80 % ( 9.5 - 15万桶) . 中国在2006年开始的战略石油储备建成. 2015年,北京计划建立有90天供应量的国家储备, 但恶劣的运输物流网络,有可能仍然不能实现.
    核电及天然气能耗占有率较小,但会越来越多.中国计划在2010年使天然气的利用率从3 %增加至8 %的总消费量. 同样,中国计划在2020年建造大约30000兆瓦核电反应堆.
   
    中国依赖外国能源进口问题已成为影响到它的战略和政策的重要因素. 它一直追求长期的能源供应协议,安哥拉和中亚,乍得,埃及,印尼,伊朗,尼日利亚,阿曼,俄罗斯，沙特阿拉伯,苏丹和委内瑞拉. 中国利用经济援助,外交关系,并且在某些情况下,出售军事技术,以确保能源交易. 中国的愿望,以满足其能源需要,而且, 导致它以与某些国家无视国际准则的问题而加强联系,从人权支持国际恐怖主义和扩散.
   
    在过去的几年中, 中国还向位于其海上运输线的国家提供经济援助和军事合作. 关注这些航线还促使中国发展海运能力,这将有助于确保它的安全通道资源通过国际水道。
   
    As China’s economy grows, dependence on secure access to markets and natural resources, particularly metals and fossil fuels, is becoming a more urgent infl uence on China’s strategic behavior. At present, China can neither protect its foreign energy supplies nor the routes on which they travel, including the Straits of Malacca through which some 80 percent of China’s cruse oil imports transit – a vulnerability President Hu refers to as the “Malacca Dilemma.”
   
    China relies on coal for some two-thirds of its energy, but its demand for oil and gas is increasing. In 2003, China became the world’s second largest consumer and third largest importer of oil. China currently imports over 40 percent of its oil (about 2.5 million barrels per day in 2005). By 2025, this fi gure could rise to 80 percent (9.5 – 15 million barrels per day). China began fi lling a strategic petroleum reserve in 2006. By 2015, Beijing plans to build reserves to the International Energy Agency standard of 90-days supply, but with poor logistics and transportation networks, this may still prove inadequate.
   
    Nuclear power and natural gas account for smaller, but growing, portions of energy consumption. China plans to increase natural gas utilization from 3 percent to 8 percent of total consumption by 2010. Similarly, China plans to build some 30 1,000- megawatt nuclear power reactors by 2020.
   
    China’s reliance on foreign energy imports has affected its strategy and policy in signifi cant ways. It has pursued long-term energy supply agreements in Angola, Central Asia, Chad, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Venezuela. China has used economic aid, diplomatic favors, and, in some cases, the sale of military technology to secure energy deals. China’s desire to meet its energy needs, moreover, has led it to strengthen ties with countries that defy international norms on issues ranging from human rights, support for international terrorism, and proliferation.
   
    In the past few years, China has also offered economic assistance and military cooperation with countries located astride key maritime transit routes. Concern over these routes has also prompted China to pursue maritime capabilities that would help it ensure the safe passage of resources through international waterways.
   
    影响中国的策略的其他因素
   
    Other Factors Infl uencing Chinese Strategy
   
    经济改革.Economic Reform.
   
    经济成就, 使中国崛起为一个区域和世界大国, 并且日益拥有强大的军事能力. 但是,结构性的弱点,威胁着经济增长. 人口迁移和社会混乱使原本薄弱的社会福利制度带来压力. 经济衰退或下滑可能引发的内乱, 因此可能导致更大的依赖民族主义来维持社会大众的支持.
    Economic success is central to China’s emergence as a regional and global power, and is the basis for an increasingly capable military. However, underlying structural weaknesses threaten economic growth. Demographic shifts and social dislocations are stressing an already weak social welfare system. Economic setbacks or downturns could lead to internal unrest, potentially giving rise to greater reliance on nationalism to maintain popular support.
   
    政治改革.Political Reform
   
    在2005年10月的民主政治白皮书上,中国领导人重申了"人民民主专政" 。并宣布中国是"反对无政府主义"。不过,内部压力为政治自由化的持续.党的领导人把持不同的政见,检查媒体和互联网,镇压工会, 西藏族和维吾尔少数民族, 和骚扰宗教团体和教会所不承认的制度. 党的戒心,任何未经授权的组织中,即使是非政治性的,唯恐这些组织可能成为反对派.
   
    In an October 2005 White Paper on Political Democracy, China’s leaders reaffi rmed the “people’s democratic dictatorship,”and declared that China is “against the anarchic call for ‘democracy for all.’” However, internal pressures for political liberalization persist. Party leaders criminalize political dissent, censor the media and internet, suppress independent trade and labor unions, repress ethnic Tibetan and Uighur minorities, and harass religious groups and churches not recognized by the regime. The Party is wary of any unsanctioned organization in China, even if non-political, fearing these organizations could facilitate organized opposition.
   
    非传统安全挑战Non-Traditional Security Challenges.
   
    例如传染病(如艾滋病病毒,禽流感),系统性腐败(根据中国官方的新闻，超过17500名政府官员在2006年前8个月被控贪污罪)，国际犯罪和毒品，交通事故和环境问题(例如污染,水资源短缺, 和可再生资源耗竭)可能会加剧中国国内的动乱,并作为源头地区紧张和不稳定.
   
    Nontraditional security challenges such as epidemic disease (e.g., HIV, avian infl uenza), systemic corruption (according to offi cial Chinese press, more than 17,500 government offi cials were prosecuted for corruption in the fi rst eight months of 2006 alone), international crime and narcotics traffi cking, and environmental problems (e.g., pollution, water shortages, and renewable resource depletion) could exacerbate Chinese domestic unrest and serve as sources of regional tension and instability.

DanTong

第3章 中国的军事战略及学说
   
    Chapter Three　China’s Military Strategy and Doctrine
   
    概况
   
    中国军事理论家已经制定了一个以改革为主导的框架学说，建设一支能够打赢信息化战争的军队，这个概念强调了现代信息技术能够增加战斗力,使解放军能在距离中国边境较远距离进行军事行动. 汲取外国冲突经验, 特别是美国主导的战争,包括阿富汗和伊拉克战争, 借鉴苏联和俄罗斯的军事理论,中国人民解放军战斗的历史虽然有限,但中国军事策划者在追求整个中国武装力量的转型.
   
    改革的速度和规模,令人印象深刻。不过,解放军依然未得到现代战争的验证。这种缺乏经验使得外界对解放军在学说方面的进展评估变得复杂. 同样，在内部的高级文职首领的评估和决策中,在大多数情况下, 缺乏直接的军事经验,这样可能存在潜在的对危机的错误估计。这种错误也同样会对远离现实的现代战场的指挥官造成灾难。
   
    Chinese military theorists have developed a framework for doctrine-driven reform to build a force capable of fi ghting and winning “local wars under conditions of informatization.” This concept emphasizes the role of modern information technology as a force-multiplier enabling the PLA to conduct military operations with precision at greater distances from China’s borders. Drawing upon lessons learned from foreign confl icts, particularly U.S.-led campaigns up to and including Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Soviet and Russian military theory, and the PLA’s own, albeit limited, combat history, Chinese military planners are pursuing transformation across the whole of China’s armed forces.
   The pace and scale of these reforms is impressive; however, the PLA remains untested in modern warfare. This lack of operational experience complicates outside assessment of the PLA’s progress in meeting the aspirations of its doctrine. The same applies to internal assessment and decision-making among China’s senior civilian leaders who, for the most part, lack direct military experience, giving rise to a greater potential for miscalculations in crises. Such miscalculations would be equally catastrophic whether based on advice from operationally inexperienced commanders or from “scientifi c” combat models divorced from the realities of the modern battlefi eld.
   
    军事战略方针
   
    Military Strategic Guidelines
   
    中国不公布一个相当于美国的国家军事战略. 外界观察家所以很少能够直接观察中国领导人关于使用武力或纳入应急的解放军部队的组织或学说. 分析权威讲话和文件表明,中国依靠被称为"军事战略方针"的总体原则和指导,在不断发展和管理目前的武装部队.
   
    解放军没有可供外界查看的内容文件，学术研究表明,目前的"指导方针"最可能的时间为1993年。这反映了过去十年中，包括1991年的波斯湾战争和苏联的垮台,对中共的军事战略思想,形成了非常基本的转变. 不过,讲话,最权威的评论, 和新的军事训练指导，显示1993年的方针,可能已经在最近修订. 这些修改,似乎反映了中国对自身安全环境的特点和现代战争(即"局部地区信息化条件下战争" ) ,中国的军事现代化过程中的经验教训, 学到了从“建立”军队，现代信息战争的备战转变为怎么能够去赢得这场战争。
   
    中国"积极防御"的方针政策 ,似乎仍然没有改变。"积极防御"是一个防御性的军事战略,而中国并不引发战争或冲突, 而战争只是为了维护国家的主权和领土完整.
   
    北京的定义对攻击其主权或领土的描述是模糊的,但是，中国现代战争史中,中国领导人曾宣称战略防御的先发制人的军事行动. 例如,中国介入朝鲜战争 ( 1950-1953年)，抵制美国援助韩国. 同样,对印度( 1962年) ,苏联( 1969年) 和越南( 1979年) 边界冲突，为"自卫反击" 这个逻辑说明可能中国进行军事先发制人，同时也许远离自己的边界,也会使用武力保护国家核心利益,包括领土要求(例如, 和台湾未解决的领土问题)
   
    一旦敌对行动已经开始,按照解放军学说( 战役学)(2000年) , 积极防御的本质是主动歼敌……而战略方针是积极防御, 军事行动重点是放在主动积极的进攻. 只有这样的战略目标,积极防御才可以实现。
   
    除了发展歼灭反对势力的能力,人民解放军正在探讨有限度使用武力. 中国人的战争理论,把这些认为是"非战争" ,用武力采取政治高压和小规模的战争行为.1995年和1996年在台湾海峡的两栖演习和导弹试射为例, "非战争"使用武力. 然而,这一概念还包括空袭和导弹袭击,暗杀和破坏活动. 然而中国打错了算盘,由于有可能进行此类行动, 如果没有更广泛的国际社会支持,将被视为战争行为.
   
    China does not publish an equivalent to the U.S. National Military Strategy. Outside observers therefore have few direct insights into the leadership’s thinking about the use of force or into the contingencies that shape the PLA’s force structure or doctrine. Analysis of authoritative speeches and documents suggests China relies on a body of overall principles and guidance known as “Military Strategic Guidelines” to plan and manage the development and use of the armed forces.
   
    The PLA has not made the contents of the “guidelines” available for outside scrutiny. Scholarly research suggests that the current “guidelines” most likely date to 1993, refl ecting the impact the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union had on PRC militarystrategic thinking, forming the basis for much of the PLA’s transformation over the past decade. However, speeches, authoritative commentary, and new military training guidance suggest that some elements of the 1993 “guidelines” may have been revised recently. These revisions appear to refl ect China’s perceptions of its security environment and the character of modern war (i.e. “local wars under conditions of informatization”), progress in and lessons learned from China’s military modernization, a shift from “building” forces for modern, information-age warfare to training to “win” such wars, as well as Hu Jintao’s own ideological imprimatur.
    The operational, or “active defense,” component of the “guidelines,” appears to remain intact. The “active defense” posits a defensive military strategy in which China does not initiate wars or fi ght wars of aggression, but engages in war only to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
   
    Beijing’s defi nition of an attack against its sovereignty or territory is vague, however. The history of modern Chinese warfare is replete with cases in which China’s leaders have claimed military preemption as a strategically defensive act. For example, China refers to its intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953) as the War to Resist the United States and Aid Korea. Similarly, authoritative texts refer to border confl icts against India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969), and Vietnam (1979) as “Self-Defense Counter Attacks.” This logic suggests the potential for China to engage in military preemption, perhaps far from its borders, if the use of force protects or advances core interests, including territorial claims (e.g., Taiwan and unresolved border or maritime claims).
   
    Once hostilities have begun, according to the PLA text, Science of Campaigns (Zhanyixue) (2000), “the essence of [active defense] is to take the initiative and to annihilate the enemy . . . . While strategically the guideline is active defense, [in military campaigns] the emphasis is placed on taking the initiative in active offense. Only in this way can the strategic objective of active defense be realized” (emphasis added).
   
    In addition to developing the capacity to annihilate opposing forces, the PLA is exploring options for limited uses of force. Chinese campaign theory defi nes these options as “non-war” uses of force – an extension of political coercion and not fullscale acts of war. The 1995 and 1996 amphibious exercises and missile fi rings in the Taiwan Strait are examples of “non-war” uses of force. However, the concept also includes air and missile strikes, assassinations, and sabotage. Such writings highlight the potential for China to miscalculate, given the likelihood that the target of any such actions, if not the broader international community, would view them as acts of war.
   不对称战争
   
    Asymmetric Warfare
   
    发展不对称是中国的军事战略和军事思想的一个根本性问题, 尤其是作为一个较弱的队打败一个更强的军队的一种手段. 自从1991年波斯湾战争，中国的军事战略家们强调采用非对称方式打击对手的脆弱技术. 1999年解放军日报社论指出,明确表示: "一个强大的敌人,也没有绝对的优势,当然不是没有缺点,可以利用较弱的一面……军事斗争需要准备更直指强敌弱点.要点中探索的不对称战争的选择可以看出,其巨额投资在弹道及巡航导弹系统,包括先进的反舰巡航导弹，水下战系统,包括潜艇和先进水雷，空间系统，计算机网络操作，以及特种作战部队.
   
    Identifying and exploiting asymmetries is a fundamental aspect of Chinese strategic and military thinking, particularly as a means for a weaker force to defeat one that is stronger. Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War and Operation ALLIED FORCE, Chinese military strategists have emphasized using asymmetric approaches to exploit vulnerabilities of technologically superior opponents. A 1999 Liberation Army Daily editorial suggested this explicitly: “a strong enemy with absolute superiority is certainly not without weakness that can be exploited by a weaker side. …[O]ur military preparations need to be more directly aimed at fi nding tactics to exploit the weaknesses of a strong enemy.” Elements of China’s exploration of asymmetric warfare options can be seen in its heavy investment in ballistic and cruise missile systems, including advanced anti-ship cruise missiles; undersea warfare systems, including submarines and advanced naval mines; counterspace systems; computer network operations; and, special operations forces.
   
    中国军事战略的秘密和欺骗
   
    The Role of Secrecy and Deception in Chinese　Military Strategy
   
    着重把握战争的主动权和让对手失去战争的平衡,使中国将军事战略的重点放在战略的欺骗,业务和战术水平.中国的物质理论认为，[诱惑]对方考虑发展中国家的误解……通过生产各种现象,有组织有计划地在人力和物资上用最小的成本,掌握战略利益的主?, 解放军借鉴了中国的历史经验和传统角色. 近几十年来在解放军重新研究中国古代军事人物孙武，孙膑，吴起,与商鞅及其著作, 包括所有含有使用欺骗手段的法则.
   
    中国共产党依赖秘密行动和军事欺骗手段来限制国家安全决策,军事能力和战略意图的透明. 但是,过分的自信可能导致军方领导人不确定计谋和欺骗. 此外, 同样的技能,指挥官是用来对付敌人可以用来掩盖或缓慢传递坏消息，中共内部解放军系统,一个长期存在的问题.保密和欺骗可能是一把双刃剑,对中国领导人对抗对手产生困惑.
   
    The stress on seizing the initiative in confl icts and keeping the adversary off balance in Chinese military strategy gives rise to a strong emphasis on deception at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Chinese doctrinal materials defi ne strategic deception as “[luring] the other side into developing misperceptions . . . and [establishing for oneself] a strategically advantageous position by producing various kinds of false phenomena in an organized and planned manner with the smallest cost in manpower and materials.”
   
    In addition to information operations and conventional camoufl age, concealment, and deception, the PLA draws from China’s historical experience and the traditional roles that stratagem and deception have played in Chinese statecraft. Recent decades have witnessed within the PLA a resurgence of the study of classic Chinese military fi gures Sun-tzu, Sun Pin, Wu Ch’i, and Shang Yang and their writings, all of which contain precepts on the use of deception.
    The Chinese Communist Party’s heavy reliance on secrecy acts in tandem with military deception to limit transparency in national security decisionmaking, military capabilities, and strategic intentions. However, over-confi dence may result from military leaders enamored with the uncertain benefi ts of stratagem and deception. In addition, the same skills commanders use against adversaries can be used to cover up or slow the transmission of bad news internal to the PLA system, a chronic problem in the PRC. Secrecy and deception may therefore be a double-edged sword, confusing China’s leaders as much as China’s adversaries.

DanTong

第4章 部队现代化目标和趋势（本章简要翻译，可看英文原文）
   
    Chapter Four　Force Modernization Goals and Trends
   
    概况
   
    中国领导人曾表示他们的意图,并且分配资源以寻求广泛的军事变革,使联合作战更加的专业化; 改进培训;更加现实的联合军事演习; 并加快购置新式武器. 就目前而言,中国的军事重点是保证能力以防止台湾独立,并且如果北京决定采取这样的做法, 迫使台湾以谈判方式解决北京的条件. 在此同时,中国正在努力打好基础,为部队能够完成了广泛的地区和全球的目标.
   
    情报界估计,中国将在本世纪末十年或稍后实现现代队，能够打败了适度规模的对手. 在建设具有这种能力过程中,中国领导人强调不对称战略,以充分利用中国的优势,同时利用潜在对手的弱点，在2007年1月的ASAT试验可以在这种背景下看待。
   
    解放军开展联合行动的目标,可以追朔到美军和联军行动的1911年的波斯湾战争的教训. 自2004年以来, 解放军已进行了多次演习,旨在培养解放军的联合作战概念,展示了新的能力, 指挥自动化系统和武器. 中国人民解放军希望最终实现综合网络指挥,控制,通讯,电脑及情报,监视和侦察( C4ISR系统) ,一个新的指挥结构,并发表了联合后勤系统. 然而,它仍然要面对合作与实际经验的联合行动中的不足.
   
    作为军队现代化建设步伐,双倍的误解可能会导致失算或者危机. 首先,其它国家可能低估的程度上,中国部队获得改善. 第二,中国领导人可能高估部队的能力,承担的新系统,熟练的操作, 并结合现有或其他新的能力充分维持.
   
    China’s leaders have stated their intentions and allocated resources to pursue broad-based military transformation to enable joint operations that encompasses force-wide professionalization; improved training; more robust, realistic joint exercises; and accelerated acquisition of modern weapons. For the moment, China’s military is focused on assuring the capability to prevent Taiwan independence and, if Beijing were to decide to adopt such an approach, to compel the island to negotiate a settlement on Beijing’s terms. At the same time, China is laying the foundation for a force able to accomplish broader regional and global objectives.
   
    The Intelligence Community estimates China will take until the end of this decade or later to produce a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-size adversary. In building such a capability, China’s leaders stress asymmetric strategies to leverage China’s advantages while exploiting the perceived vulnerabilities of potential opponents using socalled Assassin’s Mace programs. The January 2007 ASAT test could be viewed in this context.
   
    The PLA’s ambition to conduct joint operations can be traced to lessons learned from U.S. and Coalition operations since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Since 2004, the PLA has conducted a number of exercises designed to develop the PLA’s joint operational concepts and demonstrate new capabilities, command automation systems, and weapons. The PLA hopes eventually to fuse service-level capabilities with an integrated network for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), a new command structure, and a joint logistics system. However, it continues to face defi ciencies in inter-service cooperation and actual experience in joint operations.
    As PLA modernization progresses, twin misperceptions could lead to miscalculation or crisis. First, other countries may underestimate the extent to which Chinese forces have improved. Second, China’s leaders may overestimate the profi ciency of their forces by assuming new systems are fully operational, adeptly operated, adequately maintained, and well integrated with existing or other new capabilities.
   
    Emerging Area Denial/Anti-Access Capabilities
   
    In the near term, China is prioritizing measures to deter or counter third-party intervention in any future cross-Strait crises. China’s approach to dealing with this challenge centers on what DoD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report refers to as disruptive capabilities: forces and operational concepts aimed at preventing an adversary from deploying military forces to forward operating locations, and/or rapidly destabilizing critical military balances. In this context, the PLA appears engaged in a sustained effort to develop the capability to interdict, at long ranges, aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups that might deploy to the western Pacifi c. Increasingly, China’s area denial/anti-access forces overlap, providing multiple layers of offensive systems, utilizing the sea, air, and space.
   
    PLA planners have observed the primacy of precision strike in modern warfare and are investing in offensive and defensive elements of this emerging regime. China is pursuing improved ISR assets ranging from unmanned aerial vehicles, satellite constellations, and “informatized” special operations forces which could provide targeting data for long-range precision strikes when linked with robust communications. The PLA envisions precision strike capabilities suffi cient to hold at risk western Pacifi c airbases, ports, surface combatants, land and space-based C4ISR, air defense systems, and command facilities.
   
    To prevent deployment of naval forces into western Pacifi c waters, PLA planners are focused on targeting surface ships at long ranges. Analyses of current and projected force structure improvements suggest that in the near term, China is seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a layered defense that reaches out to the “second island chain” (i.e., the islands extending south and east from Japan, to and beyond Guam in the western Pacifi c Ocean). One area of apparent investment emphasis involves a combination of mediumrange ballistic missiles, C4ISR for geo-location of targets, and onboard guidance systems for terminal homing to strike surface ships on the high seas or their onshore support infrastructure. This capability would have particular signifi cance, owing to the preemptive and coercive options it would provide China in a regional crisis.
   
    Chinese military analysts have also concluded that logistics and mobilization are potential vulnerabilities in modern warfare, given the heavy requirements for precisely coordinated transportation, communications, and logistics networks. To threaten in-theater bases and logistics points, China could employ its theater ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, special operations forces, and computer network attacks. Strike aircraft, enabled by aerial refueling, could engage distant targets using air-launched cruise missiles equipped with a variety of terminal-homing warheads.
   
    Advanced mines, submarines, maritime strike aircraft, and modern surface combatants equipped with advanced ASCMs would provide a supporting layer of defense for its long-range anti-access systems. Acquisition of the KILO, SONG SHANG, and YUAN-class submarines illustrates the importance the PLA places on undersea warfare. The purchase of SOVREMENNYY II-class DDGs and indigenous production of the LUYANG I/ LUYANG II DDGs equipped with long-range ASCM and SAM systems demonstrate a continuing emphasis on improving anti-surface warfare, combined with mobile, wide-area air control.
    PLA air defense has shifted from point defense of key military, industrial, and political targets to a new Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign based on a modern, integrated air defense system and offensive and defensive counter-air operations. These operations extend beyond the defense of Chinese airspace to include strikes against an adversary’s bases (including aircraft carriers) and logistics to degrade the adversary’s ability to conduct air operations.
   
    The air defense component of anti-access/areadenial includes SAMs such as the SA-10, SA-20, HQ-9, HQ-15, and extended-range C2 suites such as the S-300PMU2. Beijing will also use Russian-built and domestic fourth-generation aircraft (e.g., Su-27 and Su-30 FLANKER variants, and the indigenous F-10). The PLA Navy would employ recently acquired Russian Su-30MK2 fi ghters, armed with AS-17/Kh-31A anti-ship missiles. The acquisition of refueling aircraft, including the Russian IL- 78/MIDAS and the indigenously developed B-6U refueling aircraft, will extend operational ranges for PLAAF and PLA Navy strike aircraft armed with precision munitions, thereby increasing the threat to surface and air forces distant from China’s coast. Additionally, acquisition of UAVs and UCAVs, including the Israeli HARPY, expands China’s options for long-range reconnaissance and strike.
   
    A fi nal element of an emerging area denial/anti access strategy includes the electromagnetic, or information, sphere. PLA authors often cite the need in modern warfare to control information,sometimes termed an “information blockade.” China is pursuing this ability by improving information and operational security, developing electronic warfare and information warfare capabilities, and denial and deception. China’s concept of an “information blockade” likely extends beyond the strictly military realm to include other elements of state power. Secrecy, information controls (including internet security), and propaganda remain hallmarks of CCP rule.
   
    In 2006, several independent researchers used a U.S.-based commercial imagery service provider’s archive of overhead imagery to identify several Chinese military-related facilities including a submarine base, a facility that appeared to replicate a contested portion of the Sino-Indian border, and a mock Taiwan airfi eld. Shortly after the publication of these studies, Chinese state-run media in August 2006 claimed that foreign map makers had illegally surveyed Chinese territory and threatened China’s security. The article referenced China’s 2002 Surveying and Mapping Law and quoted the PRC State Bureau of Survey and Mapping as stating that “foreigners who illegally survey, gather and publish geographical information on China will be severely punished.” This sequence of events may indicate that China is attempting to lay the groundwork to extend the concept of the “information blockade” into space.
   
    Strategic Capabilities
   
    Nuclear Deterrence. China is qualitatively and quantitatively improving its legacy strategic forces. These presently consist of approximately 20 silo-based, liquid-fueled CSS-4 ICBMs (which constitute its primary nuclear means of holding continental U.S. targets at risk), approximately 20 liquid-fueled, limited range CSS-3 ICBMs, between 14-18 liquid-fueled CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and upwards of 50 CSS-5 road mobile, solid-fueled medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) (for regional deterrence missions), and JL-1 SLBMs on the XIA-class SSBN.
   
    By 2010, China’s strategic nuclear forces will likely comprise a combination of enhanced CSS-4s; CSS-3s; CSS-5s; solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31s (which achieved initial threat availability in 2006, and will likely achieve operational status in the near future, if it has not already done so), and DF- 31A ICBMs (expected IOC in 2007); and the JL-1 and JL-2 SLBMs (expected IOC between 2007- 10). The addition of the DF-31 family of missiles and the JL-2 and JIN-class SSBNs will give China a more survivable and fl exible nuclear force. New air- and ground-launched cruise missiles that could perform nuclear missions will similarly improve　the survivability and fl exibility of China’s nuclear　forces.
    China’s 2006 Defense White Paper states that: 1) the purpose China’s nuclear force is to “deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China;” 2) China “upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons;” and, 3) China “has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.” The paper reiterated China’s commitment to a declaratory policy of “no fi rst use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances,” and states China “unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear weapon-free zones.” Doctrinal materials suggest additional missions for China’s nuclear forces include deterrence of conventional attacks against the Chinese mainland, reinforcing China’s great power status, and increasing its freedom of action by limiting the extent to which others can coerce China. China’s assertion of a nuclear “no fi rst use” policy, therefore, is ambiguous. This ambiguity is compounded with the juxtaposition of the “no fi rst use” declaration and the stated commitment to adhere to the principle of “counter attack in self defense.”
   
    Periodic military and civilian academic debates over the future of China’s nuclear doctrine have questioned whether or not a “no fi rst use” policy supports or detracts from China’s deterrent, and whether or not “no fi rst use” should remain in place. The Chinese government has provided public and private assurances that its “no fi rst use” policy has not and will not change. Nevertheless, coupled with the debates themselves, the introduction of more capable and survivable nuclear systems in greater numbers suggest Beijing may be exploring the implications of China’s evolving force structure, and the new options that force structure may provide.
   
    Space and Counterspace. China’s space activities and capabilities, including anti-satellite programs, have signifi cant implications for anti-access/area denial in Taiwan Strait contingencies and beyond. China further views the development of space and counter-space capabilities as bolstering national prestige and, like nuclear weapons, demonstrating the attributes of a world power.
   
    China has accorded space a high priority for investment. Premier Wen Jiabao, marking the 50th anniversary of China’s aerospace industry in October 2006, stated that “China’s aerospace industry is standing at a new starting point and facing a new situation and tasks.” It is now necessary, he said, “to implement the principle of independent innovations, leaps in key areas . . . carry out major state science and technology special projects in manned space fl ights and a lunar probe, and achieve new breakthroughs in research and development [of] aerospace equipment and . . . space technology.”
   
    Reconnaissance. China is deploying advanced imagery, reconnaissance, and Earth resource systems with military applications. Examples include the CBERS-1 and -2 satellites and the Huanjing disaster/environmental monitoring satellite constellation. China is planning eleven satellites in the Huanjing program capable of visible, infrared, multi-spectral, and synthetic aperture radar imaging. In the next decade, Beijing most likely will fi eld radar, ocean surveillance, and high-resolution photoreconnaissance satellites. In the interim, China probably will rely on commercial satellite imagery (e.g., SPOT, LANDSAT, RADARSAT, and Ikonos) to supplement existing coverage.
   
    Navigation and Timing. China has launched four BeiDou satellites with an accuracy of 20 meters over China and surrounding areas. China also uses GPS and GLONASS navigation satellite systems, and has invested in the EU’s Galileo navigation system.
    Manned Program. In October 2005, China completed its second manned space mission and Chinese astronauts conducted their fi rst experiments in space. Press reports indicate China will perform its fi rst space walk in 2007-2008, and rendezvous and docking in 2009-2012. China’s goal is to have a manned space station by 2020.
   
    Communications. China uses foreign providers, like INTELSAT and INMARSAT, for communications, but is expanding indigenous capabilities in this area. China may be developing a system of data relay satellites to support global coverage, and has reportedly acquired mobile data reception equipment that could support more rapid data transmission to deployed military forces and units.
   
    Small Satellites. Since 2000, China has launched a number of small satellites, including an oceanographic research, imagery, and environmental research satellites. China has also established dedicated small satellite design and production facilities. China is developing microsatellites – weighing less than 100 kilograms – for remote sensing, and networks of imagery and radar satellites. These developments could allow for a rapid reconstitution or expansion of China’s satellite force in the event of any disruption in coverage.
   
    Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons. In January 2007, China successfully tested a direct-ascent ASAT missile against a Chinese weather satellite, demonstrating its ability to attack satellites operating in low-Earth orbit. The direct ascent ASAT system is one component of a multi-dimensional program to generate the capability to deny others access to outer space.
   
    In a PLA National Defense University book, Joint Space War Campaigns (2005), author Colonel Yuan Zelu writes:
   
    [The] goal of a space shock and awe strike is [to] deter the enemy, not to provoke the enemy into combat. For this reason, the objectives selected for strike must be few and precise . . .[for example] on important information sources, command and control centers, communications hubs, and other objectives. This will shake the structure of the opponent’s operational system of organization and will create huge psychological impact on the opponent’s policymakers.
   
    China’s nuclear arsenal has long provided Beijing with an inherent ASAT capability. However, in recent years Beijing has pursued a robust, multidimensional counterspace program. UHF-band satellite communications jammers acquired from Ukraine in the late 1990s and probable indigenous systems give China today the capacity to jam common satellite communications bands and GPS receivers. In addition to the direct ascent ASAT program demonstrated in January 2007, China is also developing other technologies and concepts for kinetic (hit-to-kill) weapons and directed-energy (e.g., lasers and radio frequency) weapons for ASAT missions. Citing the requirements of its manned and lunar space programs, China is improving its ability to track and identify satellites – a prerequisite for effective, precise physical attacks.
   
    Information Warfare. There has been much writing on information warfare among China’s military thinkers, who indicate a strong conceptual understanding of its methods and uses. For example, a November 2006 Liberation Army Daily commentator argued:
   
    [The] mechanism to get the upper hand of the enemy in a war under conditions of informatization fi nds prominent expression in whether or not we are capable of using various means to obtain information and of ensuring the effective circulation of information; whether or not we are capable of making full use of the permeability, sharable property, and connection of information to realize the organic merging of materials, energy, and information to form a combined fi ghting strength; [and,] whether or not we are capable of applying effective means to weaken the enemy side’s information superiority and lower the operational effi ciency of enemy information equipment.
    The PLA is investing in electronic countermeasures, defenses against electronic attack (e.g., electronic and infrared decoys, angle refl ectors, and false target generators), and computer network operations (CNO). China’s CNO concepts include computer network attack, computer network defense, and computer network exploitation. The PLA sees CNO as critical to achieving “electromagnetic dominance” early in a confl ict. Although there is no evidence of a formal Chinese CNO doctrine, PLA theorists have coined the term “Integrated Network Electronic Warfare” to prescribe the use of electronic warfare, CNO, and kinetic strikes to disrupt battlefi eld network information systems.
   
    The PLA has established information warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks, and tactics and measures to protect friendly computer systems and networks. In 2005, the PLA began to incorporate offensive CNO into its exercises, primarily in fi rst strikes against enemy networks.
    Power Projection – Modernization Beyond　Taiwan
   
    In a speech at the March 2006 National People’s Congress, PLA Chief of the General Staff Liang Guanglie stated that “one must attend to the effective implementation of the historical mission of our forces at this new stage in this new century. . . preparations for a multitude of military hostilities must be done in concrete manner, [and] . . . competence in tackling multiple security threats and accomplishing a diverse range of military missions must be stepped up.”
   
    Consistent with this guidance, China continues to invest in military programs designed to improve extended-range power projection. Current trends in China’s military capabilities are a major factor in changing East Asian military balances, and could provide China with a force capable of prosecuting a range of military operations in Asia – well beyond Taiwan. Given the apparent absence of direct threats from other nations, the purposes to which China’s current and future military power will be applied remain unknown. It is certain, however, that these capabilities will increase Beijing’s options for military coercion to press diplomatic advantage, advance interests, or resolve disputes.
   
    The principal focus of, and driver for, China’s military modernization in the near term appears to remain preparing for potential confl ict in the Taiwan Strait. However, offi cial documents and the writings of Chinese military strategists suggest Beijing is increasingly surveying the strategic landscape beyond Taiwan. Some Chinese analysts have explored the geopolitical value of Taiwan in extending China’s maritime “defensive” perimeter and improving its ability to infl uence regional sea lines of communication. For example, the PLA Academy of Military Science text, Science of Military Strategy (2000), states:
   
    If Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, not only [would] our natural maritime defense system lose its depth, opening a sea gateway to outside forces, but also a large area of water territory and rich resources of ocean resources would fall into the hands of others. . . .[O]ur line of foreign trade and transportation which is vital to China’s opening up and economic development will be exposed to the surveillance and threats of separatists and enemy forces, and China will forever be locked to the west of the fi rst chain of islands in the West Pacifi c.
   
    China’s 2006 Defense White Paper similarly raises concerns about resources and transportation links when it states that “security issues related to energy, resources, fi nance, information, and international shipping routes are mounting.” The related desire to protect energy investments in Central Asia and could also provide an incentive for military investment or intervention if instability surfaces in the region. Disagreements that remain with Japan over maritime claims and with several Southeast Asian claimants to all or parts of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea could lead to renewed tensions in these areas. Instability on the Korean Peninsula likewise could produce a regional crisis in which Beijing would face a choice between a diplomatic or a military response.
    Analysis of China’s weapons acquisitions also suggests China is looking beyond Taiwan as it builds its force. For example, new missile units outfi tted with conventional theater-range missiles at various locations in China could be used in a variety of non-Taiwan contingencies. Airborne early warning and control and aerial-refueling programs will permit extended air operations into the South China Sea. Advanced destroyers and submarines refl ect Beijing’s desire to protect and advance its maritime interests. Expeditionary forces (three airborne divisions, two amphibious infantry divisions, two marine brigades, about seven special operations groups, and one regimental-size reconnaissance element in the Second Artillery) are improving with the introduction of new equipment, better unit-level tactics, and greater coordination of joint operations. Over the long term, improvements in China’s C4ISR, including space-based and over-the-horizon sensors, could enable Beijing to identify, track and target military activities deep into the western Pacifi c Ocean.
   
    Finally, analysis of PLA training activities provides an additional indication that the PLA is exploring contingencies other than Taiwan. For example, the July-August 2006 North Sword-07, a simulated, opposing-forces exercise, involved for the fi rst time two fully equipped PLA divisions with the support of the air force, Second Artillery Corps, and the People’s Armed Police. The exercise focused on long-distance maneuver, intelligence acquisition, and mobile counterattack operations.
   
    China in 2006 also conducted a series of exercises with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with the stated objective of fi ghting the “three evil forces” of international terrorism, religious extremism, and national separatism, including:
   
    “Tianshan-1 2006,” a bilateral exercise with Kazakhstan in August 2006, which took place in Almaty, Kazakhstan and Yining, China improved cooperation between law enforcement and security departments.
   
    “Cooperation 2006,” a bilateral exercise with Tajikistan in September 2006, featured 150 troops from China and 300 troops from Tajikistan in a scenario for coordinated responses to terrorist attacks.

DanTong

第5章 部队现代化的资源 （时间关系，本章仅翻译部分内容）
   
    Chapter Five　Resources for Force Modernization
   
    概况
   
    中国军队的现代化建设,包括国内的国防支出,国防工业发展和国外购买技术,所有这些因素都带动了经济的表现. 中国的经济增长已使国防部门在过去15年中的军费支出不断增加.
   
    由于国内的国防工业的成熟,中国的主要来自俄罗斯的外国武器和技术, 填补了短期的差距和能力. 从长远来看,北京谋求一个完全国产的国防工业. 中国的国防工业得益于外国直接投资和在民用部门合资企业, 技术知识和专长的学生从国外回来,和国家赞助的工业间谍活动. 欧盟的武器禁运，,对于欧盟国家与解放军的军事交流，不仅是一个重要的象征性和道德的约束。但是,解除这项禁令将扩大中国获得军事和双重用途的科技,以改善目前的武器系统与发展本国能力提供未来的系统.
   
    Sources for PLA modernization include domestic defense expenditures, indigenous defense industrial developments, and foreign technology acquisition – all of which are driven by the performance of the economy. China’s economic growth has enabled Beijing to invest ever increasing resources in its defense sector over the past 15 years.
   
    As its domestic defense industry matures, China is acquiring foreign weapons and technology, primarily from Russia, to fi ll near-term capability gaps. In the long term, however, Beijing seeks a wholly indigenous defense industrial sector. China’s defense industries benefi t from foreign direct investment and joint ventures in the civilian sector, technical knowledge and expertise of students returned from abroad, and state-sponsored industrial espionage. The EU arms embargo not only remains an important symbolic and moral restraint on EU countries’ military interactions with the PLA, but a lifting of the embargo would expand China’s access to military and dual-use technology to improve current weapon systems and develop indigenous capabilities to produce future systems.
    军事支出的趋势
   
    Military Expenditure Trends
   
    在2007年3月4日,北京宣布了增加其17.8 %的军事预算, 其官方国防预算的数字, 2007年约为45亿美元. 这样发展的趋势,每年预算的增加,大大超过整体经济发展的增长率.
   
    On March 4, 2007, Beijing announced a 17.8 percent increase in its military budget, bringing its offi cial defense budget fi gure for 2007 to approximately $45 billion. This development continues a trend of annual budget increases that exceed signifi cantly growth of the overall economy.
   
    Analysis of PRC budget data and International Monetary Fund (IMF) GDP data for the period of 1996 to 2006 shows average annual defense budget growth of 11.8 percent (infl ation adjusted) compared with average annual GDP growth of 9.2 percent (infl ation adjusted). Of note, China’s 2006 Defense White Paper contains a similar analysis in stating that between 1990 and 2005 the defense budget grew by an average of 9.6 percent between, while China’s GDP over the same period grew in constant prices an average of 9.7 percent yearly, according to the IMF. The 1996-2006 data is a more useful measure, however, as it covers the period following the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait crises and incorporates the 9th and 10th Five Year Plan periods (1996-2000 and 2001-2005, respectively) in which the post-Persian Gulf War reinvigoration of the PLA modernization drive would be fully refl ected.
   
    Substantial growth in China’s defense budget aside, China’s published defense budget does not include large categories of expenditure, including expenses for strategic forces, foreign acquisitions, militaryrelated research and development, and China’s paramilitary forces. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimates China’s total militaryrelated spending for 2007 could be as much as $85 billion to $125 billion.
   
    Accurately estimating Chinese military expenditures is a diffi cult process due to the lack of accounting transparency and China’s failure to comply with international standards for reporting military expenditures and funding. As a result, outside estimates of China’s military spending vary widely. For example, select government and independent calculations for the PLA’s expenditures for 2003 – the most recent year for which a signifi cant number of institutions published estimates – ranged from $30.6 billion to $141 billion based on offi cial exchange rates or purchasing power parity (PPP) models. China’s declared budget in that year, in contrast, was $22.3 billion.
   
    The United States and other countries have, for many years, urged China to increase transparency in defense spending. To date, Beijing has provided only highly aggregated military budget data in its Defense White Papers. Moreover, some Chinese offi cials remain opposed to candid dialogue on the subject. In response to an August 2006 press question on transparency in PLA budgeting, the PRC’s UN Ambassador in Geneva, Sha Zukang, asserted bluntly that “it’s better for the U.S. to shut up and keep quiet” about it.
   
    Foreign Weapons and Technology Acquisition
   
    In 2005, China signed arms agreements with foreign suppliers worth almost $2.8 billion, making it the third largest arms recipient among developing countries. Russia remains China’s primary weapons and materiel provider, selling it advanced fi ghter aircraft, missile systems, submarines, and destroyers. China is currently negotiating the purchase of additional surface-toair missiles, combat aircraft, aircraft engines, and assault and transport helicopters. China relies on Russian components for several of its production programs and has purchased production rights to Russian weapon designs. Russia cooperates with China on technical, design, and material support for numerous weapons and space systems; for example China’s Shenzhou manned space module is based on the Russian Soyuz capsule.
    Israel has also historically been a supplier of advanced military technology to China. The Israelis transferred HARPY UCAVs to China in 2001 and conducted maintenance on HARPY parts during 2003-2004. In 2005, Israel began to improve government oversight of exports to China by strengthening controls of military exports, establishing controls on dual-use exports, and increasing the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in export-related decisions. In January 2007, Israel implemented new dual-use export controls, based on the Wassenaar Arrangement. As of February 2007, legislation pending in the Knesset would adopt Wassenaar controls on munitions list exports. It remains unclear to what extent the new export controls will prevent additional sensitive militaryrelated transfers to Beijing in the future.
   
    Despite their history of strong arms trade relationships with China, Russia and Israel have usually refrained from transferring their most sophisticated weapons systems to China. To diversify its arms supplier base and acquire advanced technology, the PRC is looking to alternative suppliers such as Europe. Since 2003 China has been pressuring EU states to lift the embargo on lethal military sales to China that the EU imposed in response to the PRC’s 1989 crackdown on Tiananmen Square demonstrators. In their Joint Statement following the 2004 EU-China Summit, European leaders committed to work towards lifting the embargo, a pledge they repeated in 2005 and 2006. Although the issue offi cially remains on the EU agenda, the current political sentiment among most Member States remains opposed to lifting the embargo in the near future.
   
    Some Member States have advocated eliminating the embargo in the context of making the EU’s enhanced “Code of Conduct” on arms exports binding; the Code governs arms transfers to third countries but is currently a voluntary instrument. Although some in the EU have argued that ending the embargo and instead subjecting exports to China to the terms of the Code of Conduct would result in no qualitative or quantitative increases in China’s military capabilities, other EU members remain concerned, as does the United States, that the provisions of the Code remain inadequate.
   
    Lifting the EU embargo would likely contribute signifi cantly to the PLA’s modernization goals. An end to the embargo would raise the possibility of competitive pricing for arms sales to China, giving Beijing leverage to pressure its existing suppliers – including Russia, Israel, and Ukraine – to provide even more advanced weapons and favorable terms of sale. Increased military-to-military exchanges consequent to arms sales resulting from lifting the embargo could also give the PLA access to critical military management practices, operational doctrine, and training. Finally, the transfer of sophisticated military and dual-use technologies that China most likely desires from the EU – C4ISR components and systems, advanced space technology, radar systems, early-warning aircraft, submarine technology, and advanced electronics for precision-guided weapons – would advance PLA operational capabilities
   
    China continues a systematic effort to obtain from abroad through legal and illegal commercial transactions dual-use and military technologies. Many dual-use technologies, such as software, integrated circuits, computers, electronics, semiconductors, telecommunications, and information security systems, are vital for the PLA’s transformation into an information-based, networkcentric force. Several high profi le legal cases highlight China’s efforts to obtain sensitive U.S. technologies (e.g., missile, imaging, semiconductor, and submarine) illegally by targeting well-placed scientists and businessmen. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) offi cials have rated China’s aggressive and wide-ranging espionage as the leading threat to U.S. technology. Since 2000, ICE has initiated more than 400 investigations involving the illicit export of U.S. arms and technologies to China.

DanTong

第6章部队现代化与台海安全
   
    Chapter Six　Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait
   
    概况
   
    台海局势的安全,影响着大陆,台湾和美国之间的政策和行动. 中国成为一个全球性的经济力量,增加了外交影响力,改善了空军,海军和导弹部队，通过经济超过台湾，扶植台湾的外交孤立，增强了北京在台海关系中的地位，转变了台海两岸的军事平衡. 此时的台湾,却将其防务开支减少,过去十年来,台湾当局作出了必要的投资,以维持台湾的自卫能力. 美国政府已明确表示,它反对台湾海峡的任何一方单方改变现状,不支持台湾独立, 并在一个可以接受的方式下,支持和平解决两岸的分歧.
   
    The security situation in the Taiwan Strait is largely a function of dynamic interactions among policies and actions taken by the mainland, Taiwan, and the United States. China’s emergence as a global economic force, increased diplomatic clout, and improved air, naval, and missile forces strengthen Beijing’s position relative to Taipei by increasing the mainland’s economic leverage over Taiwan, fostering Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, and shifting the cross-Strait military balance in the mainland’s favor. Taiwan, meanwhile, has allowed its defense spending to decline in real terms over the past decade, creating an increased urgency for the Taiwan authorities to make the necessary investments to maintain the island’s self-defense capabilities. The U.S. Government has made clear that it opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side of the Taiwan Strait, does not support Taiwan independence, and supports peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
   
    In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act [Public Law 96-8, (1979)], the United States has taken steps to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the region. In addition to making available to Taiwan defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a suffi cient self-defense capability, the U.S. Department of Defense, through the transformation of U.S. Armed Forces and global force posture realignments, is maintaining the capacity to resist any effort by Beijing to resort to force or coercion to dictate the terms of Taiwan’s future status. For its part, Taiwan has taken important steps to improve its joint operations capability, strengthen its offi cer and non-commissioned offi cer corps, build its reserve stocks, and improve crisis response capabilities. Taiwan has bolstered its defensive capabilities by taking delivery of the fi nal two of four KIDD-class DDGs in September 2006. These improvements have, on the whole, reinforced Taiwan’s natural defensive advantages in the face of Beijing’s continuing build-up.
   
    However, Taiwan has yet to acquire other major end items offered for sale by the United States in 2001, namely, Patriot PAC-3 air defense systems, P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft, and diesel electric submarines. These systems would enable Taiwan to make necessary improvements to its air and missile defense and anti-submarine warfare capability. In the six years since the offer was made, China has continued to make signifi cant advances, some unexpected, in the capability areas these systems are designed to protect against.
   
    China’s Strategy in the Taiwan Strait
   
    Beijing appears prepared to defer unifi cation as long　as it believes trends are advancing toward that goal and that the costs of confl ict outweigh the benefi ts. In the near term, Beijing’s focus is likely one of preventing Taiwan from moving toward de jure independence while continuing to hold out terms for peaceful resolution under a “one country, two systems” framework that would provide Taiwan a degree of autonomy in exchange for its unifi cation with the mainland. Beijing is pursuing these goals through a coercive strategy – with elements of persuasion – that integrates political, economic, cultural, legal, diplomatic, and military instruments of power.
    Although Beijing professes peaceful resolution as its preferred outcome, the PLA’s ongoing deployment of short range ballistic missiles, enhanced amphibious warfare capabilities, and modern, long-range anti-air systems opposite Taiwan are reminders of Beijing’s refusal to renounce the use of force.
   
    The sustained military threat to Taiwan serves as an important backdrop to the overall campaign of persuasion and coercion. Exercises, deployments, and media operations all contribute to an environment of intimidation. For example,in a March 2006 speech before military deputies to the National People’s Congress plenary, China’s Minister of National Defense, General Cao Gangchuan, noted that the Taiwan Strait situation was “still very grim and complicated,” and proclaimed that, “all PLA offi cers and men must enhance their sense of imminent danger as well as their sense of mission and sense of responsibility, lose no time in making military preparations for military struggle, and resolutely safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity!”
   
    The circumstances in which the mainland has historically warned it would use force against the island are not fi xed and have evolved over time in response to Taiwan’s declarations and actions relating to its political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and Beijing’s view of other countries’ relations with Taiwan.
   
    These circumstances, or “red lines,” have included: a formal declaration of Taiwan independence; undefi ned moves “toward independence”; foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; indefi nite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unifi cation; Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons; and, internal unrest on Taiwan. Article 8 of the March 2005 “Anti-Secession Law” states Beijing would resort to “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces . . . cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunifi cation” are exhausted.
   
    The ambiguity of these “red-lines” appears deliberate, allowing Beijing the fl exibility to determine the nature, timing, and form of its response. Added to this ambiguity are political factors internal to the regime in Beijing that are opaque to outsiders.
   
    Beijing’s Courses of Action Against Taiwan
   
    The PLA’s capabilities to pursue a variety of courses of action are improving. In the absence of direct insights into PLA contingency planning, some analysts hold that Beijing would signal its readiness to use force imminently in an attempt to menace Taiwan in accordance with Beijing’s dictates. Others assess that the likely Chinese course of action would be designed to create military and political pressure toward a rapid resolution on Beijing’s terms before the United States or other countries would have a chance to respond. If a quick resolution is not possible, Beijing would seek to deter U.S. intervention or, failing that, delay such intervention, defeat it in an asymmetric, limited, quick war; or, fi ght it to a standstill and pursue a protracted confl ict. Rough outlines for these courses of action are presented below.
   
    Limited Force Options. A limited military campaign could include computer network attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to undermine the Taiwan population’s confi dence in its leadership. PLA special operations forces infi ltrated into Taiwan could conduct acts of economic, political, and military sabotage. Beijing might also employ SRBM, special operations forces, and air strikes against air fi elds, radars, and communications facilities on Taiwan as “nonwar” uses of force to push the Taiwan leadership toward accommodation. The apparent belief that signifi cant kinetic attacks on Taiwan would pass below the threshold of war underscores the risk of Beijing making a catastrophic miscalculation leading to a major unintended military confl ict.
   Air and Missile Campaign. Surprise SRBM attacks and precision air strikes against Taiwan’s air defense system, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities could support a campaign to degrade Taiwan defenses,neutralize its military and political leadership, and rapidly break its will to fi ght while attempting to preclude an effective international response.
   
    Blockade. Beijing could threaten or deploy a naval blockade as a “non-war” pressure tactic in the prehostility phase or as a transition to active confl ict. Beijing could declare that ships en route to Taiwan ports must stop in mainland ports for inspections prior to transiting on to Taiwan. It could also attempt the equivalent of a blockade by declaring exercise or missile closure areas in approaches and roadsteads to ports to divert merchant traffi c, as occurred during the 1995-96 missile fi rings and live-fi re exercises. Chinese doctrine also includes activities such as air blockades, missile attacks, and mining or otherwise obstructing harbors and approaches. More traditional blockades would have greater impact on Taiwan, but tax PLA Navy capabilities. Any attempt to limit maritime traffi c to and from Taiwan would likely trigger countervailing international pressure, and risk military escalation. Such restrictions would have immediate economic effects, but would take time to realize decisive political results, diminishing the ultimate effectiveness and inviting international reaction.
   
    Amphibious Invasion. Publicly available Chinese writings offer different strategies for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, the most prominent being the Joint Island Landing Campaign. The Joint Island Landing Campaign envisions a complex operation relying on supporting sub-campaigns for logistics, electronic warfare, and air and naval support, to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, and then launch an attack to split, seize, and occupy the entire island or key targets.
   
    Amphibious operations are logistics-intensive, and their success depends upon air and sea superiority in the vicinity of the operation, the rapid buildup of supplies and sustainment on shore, and an uninterrupted fl ow of support thereafter. An amphibious campaign of the scale outlined in the Joint Island Landing Campaign would tax the capabilities of China’s armed forces and almost certainly invite international intervention. Add to these strains the combat attrition of China’s forces, and the complex tasks of urban warfare and counterinsurgency – assuming a successful landing and breakout – and an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be a signifi cant political and military risk for China’s leaders.
   
    作者注:因为中国国内还没有2007年度《中国军力报告》的详文，因此我发此文是为了满足军迷对此报告的关注。因为时间的关系，我只把第1至第3章全文翻译，第4至第6章仅简要翻译。我会在最近将第4至第6章详细的翻译补齐。

DanTong

　　新说 对我核潜艇进展“意外”

　　这份《2007年中国军力报告》的核心内容是强调中国是美国“最大的潜在军事对手”。新报告对中国“晋”级新战略核潜艇的进展步伐“感到意外”。据新军力报告描述，中国的“晋”级战略核潜艇可以携核弹头，其导弹的射程达8000公里，而中国要建造五艘“晋”级核潜艇，其中第一艘已于去年下水，并且明年就可以形成战力。

　　称我导弹射程覆盖全美

　　报告同时特别关注中国的陆基机动式“东风－31A”型洲际弹道导弹。该型导弹的射程据说能“覆盖全美国”。新报告对中国大陆在台湾海峡部署导弹“仍表关注”。此外，报告还关心今年年初中国进行的反卫星导弹试验。报告还质疑解放军发展航空母舰的意图以及能力，但报告分析，短期之内中国不太可能拥有具备战力的航母。

　　与往年的报告相比，今年的报告明显加大了对中国军队“杀手锏”武器装备的研发与装备的关注度，而对中国部队的传统军力关注程度有所减弱。

　　陈词 把中国描绘成敌对国家

　　这份报告指出，美国欢迎一个和平与繁荣的中国崛起，但是中国的未来前景仍不确定，其中包括中国扩张的军力及其如何使用军力的意图。美国在报告中，对中国军事发展速度感到吃惊，称尤其是中国正在建造的可搭载远程核弹头的新型核潜艇，已对核平衡构成威胁。另外，该报告担忧中国开发高端武器系统技术的能力，特别强调，中国具备有与美国军力抗衡的“最大潜力”，拥有“破坏性军事技术”，将中国描绘成一个冷战风格的敌对国家。

　　指责中国军力打破平衡

　　报告不仅夸大海峡两岸军事实力对比，还指责中国全力“防独促统”，而且武断地宣称，中国还在为诸如争夺资源与领土的冲突等其他地区性突发事态积蓄军力。报告竟然说中国军力的扩张是导致亚太军事力量平衡变动的重要因素。报告更污蔑中国出于对国际能源需求的考虑，加强与一些违反国际人权、支持国际恐怖主义与核扩散的国家的关系等。

　　核心提示

　　北京时间26日凌晨，美国国防部发布了长达50页的《2007年中国军力报告》，五角大楼于当天提交给国会。这份长达50页的报告称，近年来，通过对国防和高科技产业的持续高投入、购置先进武器和进行深入的军事改革，中国军事转型的步伐和范围均有所加大。中国不断增长的军事能力是改变东亚军事平衡的一个“主要因素”，其战略军事能力的提高所造成的影响远远超出亚太地区。与往年相比，新报告特别关注中国的新核潜艇和远程导弹，对传统军力的关注程度有所减弱。

　　25日公布的报告在重复以往论调的同时，还对中国战略军事力量和太空技术的发展以及军事现代化的意图等说三道四，妄加猜测。与往年一样，报告重申了近年来美国对华政策的总基调，认为中国作为一个具有全球性抱负的地区政治经济大国的迅速崛起，是“当今战略环境的一个重要因素”，“一个对地区和全球都具有重要影响的因素”；美国欢迎一个和平与繁荣的中国的崛起，鼓励中国作为负责任的国际利益攸关方，为维护全球体系的健康和成功担负起更大的责任。

　　《2007年中国军力报告》主要内容

　　涉及方面主要内容

　　武器装备强调中国是美国“最大的潜在军事对手”

　　技术开发称中国拥有能多次抵消美国传统军事优势的“破坏性军事技术”

　　对外政策对近年来中国在中俄合作、北京“中非峰会”及“日本入常”等问题上的政策提出责难

　　国家关系污蔑中国出于对国际能源需求的考虑，加强与一些违反国际人权、支持国际恐怖主义与核扩散的国家的关系

　　海峡两岸夸大海峡两岸军事实力对比，指责中国全力“防独促统”

　　言论 美国国防部长辩称“没夸大其词”

　　在五角大楼发表这份报告的前一天，美国国防部长盖茨在记者会上“特意”进行了一番说明，说很乐意向大家推荐，这份报告的内容“并没有夸大其词”。可是，仔细阅读了这份报告后，不难发现，与以往类似的年度报告并没有两样，仍然在对中国的军事能力进行妄加评论，攻击中国的军事现代化建设。可以说，报告对“中国军事威胁” 的突出渲染，实在是太夸张了。
　　解读 报告实质是干涉中国内政

　　26日上午，中国社会科学院美国所美国问题专家何维保对美国发布的《2007年中国军力报告》做了点评。

　　何维保认为美国军力报告对中国的新核潜艇和远程导弹的关注是必然的。近年，中国海军防御开始向远洋发展，美国认为这在某种程度上是对其的一种挑战。“其实，美国的核潜艇和远程导弹的技术还是高于中国的，它如此关注核潜艇和远程导弹等问题，是因为中国在技术上取得一些新发展，引起美国的关注。”何维保说。到今年为止，美国已发布7次《中国军力报告》。何维保表示，这实质上是对中国内政的干预。“美国的这种做法极其不友好，对别国事务指手画脚，相当于干涉别国内政。”一直以来，美国在其发布的《中国军力报告》中渲染中国威胁论。一方面，美国企图以此影响中国周边国家对中国产生怀疑态度。另一方面，美国也想借此机会拉拢中国周边国家，希望它们到美国寻求帮助，同时也在国际上给美国树立一个良好形象。但是，美国并不能达到这种假想目的。何维保说，中国与周边关系友好，大部分周边国家都相信中国是维护周边地区的稳定力量。

　　背景

　　《中国军力报告》至今已发表了7次。《中国军力报告》的具体承办单位是美国国防部，从理论上来说应当是一个具有权威性的报告，但现实情况却不然。《中国军力报告》很大程度上依赖公开材料，包括中国的国防白皮书、学者的谈话和论著。另外还有各思想库和媒体发表的研究成果和新闻报道。但是报告并不是无懈可击。德国前总理施密特之前在评论往年类似报告时称，这样的报告“误导”了世人，夸大了中国的军费开支，中国不会对任何国家构成军事威胁。

　　《2006年中国军力报告》

　　关键词：失衡

　　渲染中国“军事威胁论”，诬称中国军事扩张造成“区域失衡”。该报告说，中国的军事发展让美国分析家惊讶，尤其是解放军的战略部队现代化速度与规模。

　　《2005年中国军力报告》 关键词：军费

　　报告声称，中国的实际军费开支估计是中国自己公布数额的两倍到三倍，当年可高达900亿美元，这个数额是亚洲最高的，在世界上仅排在美俄两国之后。

　　《2004年中国军力报告》 关键词：冷战

　　报告建议台湾将三峡大坝作为军事目标。中国外交部发言人在答记者问时说，该报告充满冷战思维，心怀叵测。

　　《2003年中国军力报告》 关键词：台湾

　　该报告声称为台湾海峡潜在的冲突做准备是中国军事现代化的首要目标。

　　《2002年中国军力报告》 关键词：方针

　　这份军力报告重点描述了中国军事方针与武力结构的发展。

　　《2000年中国军力报告》（首份） 关键词：威胁

　　2000年五角大楼发布首份《中国军力报告》，首次提出“中国威胁论”。

　　（本组稿件据新华社、《法制晚报》）